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I. INTRODUCTION
As we move towards an almost certain comprehensive federal law to
address climate change,1 increasing attention is being paid to what will
happen to state and local climate change and climate change-related
programs that have arisen in this country in the last few years.2 As the
symposium demonstrated, California has a particular concern that
federal law might block its environmental and climate change policies.
The debate has generally been fought between businesses that favor
preemption and environmental interests that prefer no preemption.3 At a
recent federal hearing on the Waxman-Markey draft bill (April 2009),
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued for a full state preemption
provision while the National Association of Clean Air Agencies argued
to eliminate any preemption language in the bill.4 According to William
Kovacs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s vice president for environment,
technology, and regulatory affairs:
Compliance with the federal cap-and-trade program set by [the draft legislation]
will undoubtedly be very complicated for businesses, who will be forced to
comply with hundreds of new regulations and mandates. To tack on a
state program, or a regional program, or both, is to make an already cumbersome
cost of compliance tantamount to an incentive to relocate a business to another
state, or, worse yet, another country.5

Conversely, Bill Becker of the National Association of Clean Air Agencies
explained that retaining states’ rights to regulate was important. Becker
stated, “[I]f the bill is weakened as it moves through the legislative
process, and yet [if the preemption of states] remains, states would be
required to surrender their successful programs and revenue in exchange
for an inferior federal program.”6
Both sides can find support in prior environmental law. Most current
environmental control regimes explicitly allow states to go above federal
health-based environmental standards, if they choose, in the air, water,

1. Victor B. Flatt, Federal Climate Change Legislation-The Perspective From
2008, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 195, 195 (2008).
2. See William Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261 (2008); Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism,
107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 63 (2008); Robert Glicksman & Richard Levy, A
Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental
Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 580 (2008).
3. Andreen, supra note 2, at 267-68.
4. Robin Bravender, Enviros, States Caution Against Preemption Language in
Waxman-Markey Bill, E&E DAILY, Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2009/
04/27/8/ (on file with author).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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and hazardous waste arenas.7 However, the restriction on state deviation
from federal car-manufacturing standards is one notable exception to
states’ ability to require stringent standards above federal requirements;
California is the lone exception.8
One possible way to understand this historic distinction is to separate
product and production standards from other health and safety standards.
Professor Ann Carlson has suggested that “[e]ven proponents of a strong
state role in environmental policymaking advocate federal preemption
for the regulation of products for which there is a national market.”9 If
business arguments to promote preemption consist of product or
production arguments, then these may be re-characterized as solely
“product pre-emption” arguments. Similarly, environmentalist arguments
that claim that refusing to preempt state environmental laws does not
cause inefficiencies or harm might be criticized as having ignored
circumstances that deal with products.
Under this reasoning, product-based standards should generally be
uniform while other health and safety standards could be subjected to
more stringent state regulation. This, of course, fits with the general
breakdown of power between the states and the federal government, in
that the federal government is given exclusive jurisdiction over interstate
commerce (to the benefit of all),10 but state and local governments are
generally seen as better able to operate to protect health and safety
interests through the exercise of localized police power.11
Much understanding can be gained by examining the basis behind this
distinction in federalism history. For instance, the framers recognized a
dichotomy between economic protectionism, which should be avoided
for the benefit of all, and the states’ exercise of legitimate interests in
protecting its citizens.12 Similarly, policies governing modern international
trade recognize a similar separation; the trade policies generally prohibit
7. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2009); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370 (2009); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2009).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7543.
9. Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 M ICH. L. R EV .
F IRST IMPRESSIONS 63, 67 (2008).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-67 (1995) (noting that the
federal government does not have “general police powers” such as the states do); see
also Alexandra Klass, State Innovations and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate
Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1666 (2009).
12. Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP.
L. REV. 173, 205 (2003).

65

FLATT (DO NOT DELETE)

2/12/2016 12:59 PM

laws that favor one market or business interest over another but allow
such when their primary purpose amounts to protecting the health and
well-being of a country’s citizens.13
However, this does not provide a simple solution to the question of
which state and local climate change policies should be preempted. First, is
this dichotomy actually correct? In her comment, Professor Carlson notes
that empirical evidence suggests that separate state product standards
may not be problematic.14 Even if the distinction between product and
health and safety is valid, where do various climate change policies fall
on this spectrum? Are cap-and-trade schemes more like a product, meaning
that it should be uniform, or more like a local health and safety requirement,
meaning that a state should be allowed to tailor requirements to meet its
own needs?
Luckily, we can examine climate-change preemption outside of
theory. In most areas, almost 40 years of environmental federalism has
allowed states to regulate beyond the federal government for the
protection of their citizens, and we can examine this history empirically
in order to determine whether and in which circumstances preemption is
necessary. In particular, we can observe when states have exercised
their authority to go beyond federal-government protections and how
this affects the well-being (economically and environmentally) of the
country as a whole. We can then analogize these to climate-change
policies that currently exist and are subject to the preemption debate.15
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST PREEMPTION
Professors Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy recently proposed a
framework for viewing preemption in an environmental context, which
tracks some of the theoretical reasons for and against preemption, as
noted above. According to Glicksman and Levy, preemption should be
viewed as a means of understanding the allocation of power between the
federal and state governments.16 Given this premise, they argue that
federal preemption displacing states’ authority is justified only by a
particularized reason, such as an economic or federalism interest.17 If no
13. Andrew Green & Tracy Epps, Is There a Role for Trade Measures in
Addressing Climate Change?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2008).
14. Carlson, supra note 9, at 67.
15. Professor Klass’s article on how the dynamics of federalism should be influenced
by state action is also an interesting way to approach the “dynamic federalism” which
encompasses environmental laws. Klass, supra note 11, at 1655-57. However, I am limiting
my review of past environmental laws to traditional notions of explicit federalism.
16. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 2, at 580 (2008).
17. Id. at 589.
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purpose is served by the preemption, then displacing sovereign state
power is uncalled for.18
The federal government should preempt state action, in Glicksman
and Levy’s view, when the federal government proposes to address
“collective action problems”—that is, problems that arise when state
policymakers have perverse incentives to regulate, which is brought on
when regulatory benefits accrue for their constituents but regulatory
costs spread among citizens outside of their jurisdiction.19 Unfettered,
such behavior would result in a state economic competition in which all
states would create policies that initially might benefit their own citizens
but, in the aggregate, hurt everyone20—a “commons” problem.21
In the environmental context, Glicksman and Levy note that preemption
in the environmental arena would, thus, be justified if and when “collective
action problems create incentives for states to act individually to regulate
in ways that are contrary to the interests of the states as a collective.”22
According to their analysis, this justification substantiates the floor
preemption common to most environmental laws, and it would permit
states to regulate above federal floors if the state feels that such
regulation is necessary. The justification also validates preemption of
some state Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) policies, which would
restrict locations of environmental negatives when the benefits are
important to everyone.23
Though Glicksman and Levy rightfully criticize the abuses of costbenefit application, their analysis can be summarized as favoring federal
preemption if it is necessary to promote better, more cost-efficient
outcomes for the entire country.24 If efficient outcomes exist overall
without federal preemption, then preemption should be avoided. Though
not everything can be reduced to dollars and cents in determining what
18. Id. at 585, 88.
19. Id. at 592-93.
20. Glicksman and Levy refer to this as the basis behind the McCulloch v.
Maryland decision, quoting Chief Justice Marshall. Id. at 592 n.64.
21. A “commons” problem occurs when persons have unfettered access to a
commons resource and so deplete the resource faster than it could be sustained. Everyone is
ultimately better off with a sustained resource, but since no one has the legal right to bar
others from the “commons,” everyone has an incentive to use as much as quickly
as possible. See generally Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/162/3859/1243.
22. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 2, at 593.
23. Id. at 593-94.
24. Id. at 602-03, 608-10.
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constitutes efficiency, one can examine costs on individuals, businesses,
and the government, which may both generally result in shared
nationwide burdens to the public as well as lie entirely within a single
state’s boundaries. Under this rubric, costs borne by everyone should be
avoided if they are imposed for the sole benefit of the citizens of one
state.
Using this framework, we can analyze the operation of prior federal
environmental laws, which generally preempt states from lessening
environmental regulation but permit states to regulate more strictly if
they choose. In so doing, we can empirically observe when states utilize
their power to exceed uniform federal regulation and where the costs and
benefits of that exercise fall. On one hand, if it appears that states utilize
this power in a way that implies a collective action problem, then that
may signify that our historic approach to federalism in environmental
laws is not justified and, similarly, that climate change bills should be
more aggressive in preempting state policies that might conflict with a
uniform federal standard. On the other hand, if the exercise of state
regulatory prerogatives point to legitimate state interests that do not
generally impose disproportionate external costs, then such a framework
is by and large successful and could be applied to the climate change
context to see where and on whom climate change regulatory burdens
would likely fall.
III. GOING BEYOND FEDERAL STANDARDS UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT (CAA)
The Clean Air Act contains an explicit savings clause that preserves
state laws and common law with respect to general clean air protection
(with the exception of regulation of mobile sources) if these laws reach
beyond federal minimum regulations.25 Moreover, the very structure of
the Clean Air Act’s enforcement of National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) provides states with almost complete flexibility in
determining how they will meet this standard within their own borders.26
There are two important exceptions to this non-preemption in the
CAA. One, the federal government may not approve a state implementation
plan if it has a significant detrimental impact on another state’s ability to

25. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2009) (“Except as otherwise provided in
[sections preempting certain state regulation of moving sources] nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution . . . “).
26. Id. at § 7410.
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meet the NAAQS.27 Two, the federal government may preempt states
relative to mobile sources, but even this “exception” contains a significant
provision that allows California to adopt a more stringent mobile-source
standard; furthermore, other states may choose between the federal and
California standards.28
Therefore, in general, the Clean Air Act does not preempt state clean
air standards and controls, even when state regulations extend beyond
federal standards. The Act does not preempt even were each state to
choose a different standard for an otherwise similar source. So how
have the states exercised their ability to go beyond federal standards?
Have they utilized them frequently? If so, have they done so in a
“negative” way, that is, in a way that favors their own citizenry at the
expense of businesses, government, and consumers nationwide?
Interestingly, despite states’ ability to regulate beyond federal standards,
with respect to criteria pollutants, they have chosen not to do so. In fact,
the opposite is the case. It is federal law that has pushed states to meet
minimum standards of air quality within their own jurisdictions by
continuing to create more severe penalties for states that fail to comply
with minimum federal standards.29
Conversely, while federal statutes reflect the federal primacy in air
quality protection, on occasion, the states have had to pressure the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement these laws
properly. While each state has not pushed the EPA to act more stringently
with respect to itself, states have had to generally push the EPA to
enforce requirements that prohibit state implementation plans from
causing significant failure of another state in meeting national air quality
standards.30
What explains this behavior? Seemingly, with respect to states exceeding
federal standards by imposing additional controls on sources in their
own states, there is no incentive for them to do so. Higher standards
would simply cost businesses in the state more money, and the federal
standards presumably provide sufficient protection. However, there

27. Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
28. Id. at § 7543.
29. CRAIG JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 285 (2d ed.
2007).
30. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“In August 1997, eight states submitted petitions requesting that the EPA find that
stationary sources in upwind states contribute significantly to downwind air pollution”).
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would be an incentive to push the EPA to require other states to control
air pollutants that cause the host state harm because those costs would
fall out-of-state, and the benefits would fall in-state.
Through the lens of Glicksman and Levy, it would appear that,
structurally, giving states the right to exceed federal standards in air
quality does not create a collective action problem, i.e. there exists no
situation in which states could improve the air quality in their own states
at a cost to other states. Although increasing air quality provisions could
act as a sort of tax on products manufactured in a state, which could then
be borne nationwide, states own costs in lost industry and tax benefits,
presumably, more than offset such a nation-borne cost. Indeed, the
states would expectedly engage in a race to the bottom in air quality,
which was one of the major justifications for the federal Clean Air Act
and its minimum provisions in the first place.31
Still, states’ attempts to induce the EPA to enforce existing minimum
standards on other states’ transport of criteria air pollutants provides us
with an example in which states can improve their own air quality by
increasing costs outside their boundaries. However, this does not amount to
a “collective action problem” since it corrects distorted economic signals,
instead of distorting correct ones. In the parlance of Glicksman and
Levy, not enforcing environmental standards on the states that push
costs beyond their borders would be a failure to correct a state’s selfinterested action that harmed others.32
The case of hazardous air pollutants is similarly illustrative. With
respect to hazardous air pollutants, states are given the ability to provide
for additional controls on the sources of these pollutants beyond federal
requirements.33 In this case, many states have exercised this grant of
authority.34 These states still face additional costs because they have
regulated above the federal minimum standard, 35 but many state

31. Whether or not a race to the bottom has occurred was the subject of many
articles in the late 1990s, but it is interesting to note that if the states would have had an
incentive to increase their states own environmental health quality by going above a
federal minimum, they generally have not done that either. See generally Scott Saleska
& Kirsten Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the
Theoretical Debate on the Race to the Bottom in State Environmental Standard-setting, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998).
32. In the CAA, other states are harmed if they face the costs of effective regulation but
must share the pollution harms of states that choose not to exercise effective control.
33. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 7416 (retention of state authority); see also Victor B.
Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal Hazardous Air Pollution
Regulation and What We Can Learn From the States, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107 (2007).
34. Flatt, supra note 33, at 123.
35. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Petroleum Refineries, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,716, 50,726 (proposed Sept. 4, 2007) (discussion
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governments also receive a benefit in the form of citizens’ improved
health quality.36
What accounts for the difference between transport of criteria air
pollutants and hazardous air pollutants? It appears that, unlike the
situation for criteria air pollutants, there is serious concern that the
federal government has not successfully protected citizens with respect
to hazardous air pollutants.37 Therefore, states have continued with their
own hazardous air pollution regulation and moved to issue their own
controls to protect their citizens, even though the costs are primarily
borne within the state itself.38 Notwithstanding, it seems that the need
for states to protect their own citizens is not enough to spur some states
to tackle hazardous air pollutant health problems, demonstrating again
the incentive for some states to “race to the bottom.”39
In summary, since the passage of the Clean Air Act in the 1970s,
states have not exercised their prerogatives to regulate beyond control
standards required to meet the minimum national ambient air quality
standards but, rather, have exercised their prerogative to exceed federal
standards with respect to hazardous air pollutants. States have also acted
to force the federal government to meet the federally mandated standards
regarding air pollution transport, which was designed to avoid commons
actions problems.
IV. GOING BEYOND FEDERAL STANDARDS UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act created a shared federalism program structure
very similar to the Clean Air Act. It has provisions that require specific
performance standards as well as provisions that require the states to
maintain a water quality level through point-source controls.40 The
of costs of benzene control mechanisms in petroleum refineries, which were rejected by
the EPA in its proposed residual risk rulemaking for petroleum refineries in 2007).
36. Flatt, supra note 33, at 123-24 (describing California’s two health based air
toxics standards).
37. Id. at 121-22.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Andrea L. Clements et al., THE CONTROL OF AIR TOXICS: TOXICOLOGY
MOTIVATION AND HOUSTON IMPLICATIONS, FINAL REPORT 2-3 (2006) (discussing pollution
conditions and controls in Houston) (on file with the author) available at http://hydrology.
rice.edu/ceve/fraser/FINAL %20MASTER.pdf.
40. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311–13 (2009). A “point source” is defined
as “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance.” Id. at § 1362(14).
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Clean Water and Clean Air Acts differ mostly in that the Clean Water
Act originally focused more on the point-source controls, whereas the
Clean Air Act envisioned air quality through state work in the stateimplementation plans.41
Nevertheless, the Clean Water Act also grants states the right to
exceed federal standards—in language almost identical to that in the
Clean Air Act42—and, through the joint federalism program, some
leeway in reaching water quality standards.43 Additionally, under the
Clean Water Act, states even have some flexibility regarding how
stringently they may regulate water quality standards for specific
waterways, which digresses from the Clean Air Act’s uniform
requirements.44
The experience of the states with respect to the Clean Water Act has
been very similar to their experiences with the Clean Air Act. The major
problem has been getting the states to meet the minimum standards.45
This is consistent with the theory that requiring applicants within a state
to attain higher standards would be costly to the state, so the state would
have no incentive to engage in such behavior. Again, like the Clean Air
Act, the Clean Water Act was designed to discourage states from
engaging in the expected behavior that they would attempt to lower
standards in order to attract business.46
However, the Clean Water Act does require all federal permit applicants
to certify that the granting of a permit will not violate state water quality
standards.47 The history of this statutory-certification section supports
the idea that states may use it to protect their own interests against other
interests. In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Water Act’s
401 certification program allowed states to condition Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) licensing of hydroelectric facilities.48
Since that time, courts have allowed states to successfully use 401

41. JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 139.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
43. Though states have flexibility in how they will reach water quality standards, the
Clean Water Act is more specific about procedural requirements. The Clean Water Act
anticipates effectuating the water quality standards through a specific method known as
Total Maximum Daily Load (or TMDL). 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). For an example of state
flexibility in determining how best to meet water quality standards for impaired waters,
see Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th. Cir. 2002).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
45. JOHNSTON ET AL, supra note 29, at 138.
46. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing
Congress’s insistence of establishing uniform standards across each industry).
47. This provision is otherwise known as “401 certification.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
48. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700 (1994).
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certifications to stop or modify hydroelectric projects.49 This fits with
Glicksman and Levy’s collective action theory, as protection of a state’s
waters benefits those within the state, but the cost of losing hydroelectric
power may reach beyond it.
The case of Arkansas v. Oklahoma provides another example of states
attempting to engage in collective action behavior.50 In this case, the
State of Oklahoma challenged the EPA’s grant of a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to the city of Fayetteville,
Arkansas for a publicly-owned treatment work.51 Oklahoma claimed that
the discharges that would flow into Oklahoma added pollution to an
already-impaired water body.52 The Supreme Court ruled that, while the
EPA had to preserve Oklahoma’s water quality, the amount of pollutant
added to the Oklahoma water body was de minimis.53 Although the
State of Oklahoma lost the case, the facts illustrate how states might
freely try to impose costs on other states, even for relatively small instate benefits.
V. LESSONS FROM HISTORY
The aforementioned air and water examples generally indicate that
states do not exercise their prerogative to regulate above federal
pollution standards. The reasoning behind this seems obvious: in most
cases, the costs borne by exceeding federal standards fall within the state
in the form of higher operating costs, job-loss, and taxes. In such cases,
states have no incentive to exceed the federal standard, and, therefore,
they do not. Where states have extended regulations—for instance, with
air toxics, they were willing to bear the burdens because internal benefits
exceeded the costs. Neither situation presented a collective action problem
because states were unable to impose costs of increased regulation to
outside jurisdictions. Thus, when states have an opportunity to exceed
federal standards, and when states exercising that right bear the costs of
so doing, no reason supports preemption. Indeed, states must retain that
ability in order to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.

49. Peter Henner, Rapanos and Warren—A Tale of Two Cases: The Supreme Court
Bats .500, 12 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 52, 86 (2007).
50. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
51. Id. at 95.
52. Id. at 97.
53. Id. at 113-14.
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Likewise, most attempts by states to assist their citizens where the
costs fall outside the state cannot be seen as a collective action problem.
The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts include legislative provisions for
states to try and control pollution in other states that cross in-state
boundaries. Though these controls impose costs to outside states, such
costs belong to the outside states in the first instance.
When a pollution-receiving state seeks for pollution-producing states
to control pollution that crosses state boundaries, the pollution-receiving
state does create benefits for its citizens and a cost in the pollutionproducing state; but generally, the pollution-receiving state is only
correcting the pollution-creating state’s attempt to impose costs on it.
There may arise a situation in which a pollution-receiving state is
seeking to impose a large cost or additional burden beyond the safe and
fair level in another state, such as what can occur in a 401-certification
context or in other water quality contexts. Though some economic
arguments claim that these two situations are identical,54 common law
recognizes the distinction of which party is lawfully entitled to a benefit
and emphasizes that costs and benefits should be internalized (considered
by) the decision-making party creating them.55 Thus, when the law prevents
a “race to the bottom,” as the former example sets forth, it creates an
economically aligned decision consistent with the common law, whereas
the latter example produces the opposite result.
In essence, when a state fails to control its own sources that harm
other states, it is the result of a real collective action problem, and law
that prevents this, such as sections 110 and 126 of the Clean Air Act,
should be enforced. Therefore, we should encourage any states that
attempts to induce the EPA to control an outside state’s air pollution that
causes the state to exceed its NAAQSs, particularly since this would
directly address the collective action problem.
In a situation such as Arkansas v. Oklahoma, in which one state tried
to impose costs that it would not have imposed on itself upon another
state disproportionate to the benefits, the law did not allow that imposition
to occur. The court reasoned that state water quality objections had to be
reasonable, which is also consistent with the common law.56 In other
words, the current structure of the federal water pollution control laws
that are designed to prevent outside states from exporting pollution also
precludes an affected state from overreaching on pollution control.
54. Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost, Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 401 (1997).
55. Victor B. Flatt, He Should at His Peril Keep It There: How the Common Law
Tells Us that Risk-Based Corrective Action is Wrong, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 358
(2001).
56. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 104.
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Section 401 certifications do seem to present collective-action-problem
opportunities. No similar certification provisions exist in the Clean Air
Act, though the Clean Air Act also prohibits federal agencies from
taking actions that would harm a state’s air quality.57 This distinction
may explain how and when preemption may be necessary, which seems
to turn on the issue of whether the federal government’s decisionmaking involves strong deference to states. In the case of the Clean Air
Act, though the federal law does not allow a state to cause problems with
another state’s air quality (as in interstate pollutant transport), the state is
not the final arbiter of whether such a problem occurs. Sections 110 and
126 of the CAA, which address interstate air pollution spillover, vest the
determination of cause and effect within the EPA. This is similar to the
EPA’s ultimate control on recognizing out of state water quality impacts
under Section 402 of the CWA in the Arkansas v. Oklahoma case. With
respect to 401 certification, the states themselves are the final arbiters,
and their decisions are not necessarily tempered with the reasonableness
standard that the EPA supplied in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. Thus, allowing a
state to set and maintain high standards, even when costs fall outside of
that state, appears less problematic than failing to provide an effective
review or reasonableness standard to go along with it.
One situation in environmental legal history in which a state exceeded
federal standards that imposed a significant cost outside of that state
(that is, not for the correction of an external benefit), is the Clean Air
Act waiver provision, which permits California to exceed federal
standards in mobile source design. Republicans in Congress have argued
that such a policy imposes substantial costs outside of California.58
However, it seems that significant costs also fall within California—
primarily in the form of higher automobile prices because auto
manufacturers also have the ability to shift much of costs external to
California back to California.59
Does this mean that states should even be allowed to exceed federal
product standards? Since even strong environmentalists acknowledge
the possibility that multiple standards may present too high of a cost to

57. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (2009).
58. A particular example used is Michigan because of the job losses already occurring
there in the automobile industry. See quote from Representative John Boehner, Jan. 26,
2009, available at http://republicanleader.house.gov/blog/?p=413 (last visited Aug. 3,
2009).
59. Carlson, supra note 9, at 67.
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business and ultimately the consumer, this is an important question. No
clear-cut answer exists, drawing from environmental history. Certainly,
many other states have adopted the California automobile standards, as
permitted by the Clean Air Act, but since the Act does not permit
multiple state-formulated automobile standards, we do not know what
states would have opted for had more choices been available.
Even absent empirical proof, I suggest that it would have been
unlikely for states to adopt standards beyond the federal or California
paradigms, primarily because the in-state costs of adopting in state
specific standards would serve as an incentive to avoid this action.
California has a huge automobile market. Through its own standard,
California raises the price of cars, but because of its large market, the
prices are not so large per car, and that cost is apparently offset by the
benefit that California receives in lower air pollution from mobile
sources. It is almost impossible to imagine Vermont, or even Iowa,
doing the same thing. Even if they had air pollution problems as
extensive as California’s, a unique market in either of these two states
would be exceedingly expensive. For instance, in the case of a state like
Vermont, the market might be so small that unique standards would
force all product providers to pull out of the market completely. These
smaller-market states, however, can piggyback on California’s standard
because products are already produced for the California market.
As far as appliance standards are concerned, only a few states have
attempted to impose regulatory standards above the federal minimum,
even in the face of federal inaction.60 And there is evidence from the
historic pattern of state action and federal response that any action that
states did take relative to appliance regulation may only have been for
the sole purpose of pressuring the federal government to adopt a
standard.61
A similar analogy can be drawn from state regulation of insurance
providers. As the costs of insuring coastal states have increased, insurers
have indicated that they may pull out of markets completely if the states
prevent them from recouping costs associated with coastal storms, and
small states are the most vulnerable to that economic threat.62

60. Id. at 65-66.
61. Id.
62. Christopher Swope, State and Insurers Collide. What Happens when Gulf Coast
states and Insurers Collide, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, available at http://www.Insurance
newsnet.com/article.asp?neid=20070218125.18_8f6e012f90943e40 (last visited Aug. 3,
2009); State Farm to pull out of Florida homeowner’s market, PANTAGRAPH.COM, available at
http://www.pantagraph.com/articles/2009/01/28/money/doc497f404d0656c167076662.txt
(last visited Aug. 3, 2009).
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Before the modern Clean Air Act, when air pollution was traditionally
a state concern, only one state—California—had attempted to regulate
automobile product standards. This indicates once more the unlikelihood of
a state adopting a unique product standard to control pollution, and, even
so, any adoption would only likely occur where both the need was great
and a market could be supported. This suggests that, despite rhetoric, in
terms of product standards and environmental harm, we should generally
allow states to exceed federal standards since the evidence supports that
states will only do so where the need is great, and, in such circumstances,
costs can generally be put back on states that do so. Certainly, a real
collective action problem, as defined by Glicksman and Levy, does not
seem present in such a situation.
VI. APPLICATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
What does all of this tell us about preemption of state and local
climate change policies? The obvious parallel between climate-changedriven fuel-economy standards and the California Clean Air Act waiver
provision indicates that the federal government should not preempt state
fuel standard-setting. It is hard to imagine that a state would embark on
higher fuel efficiency standards on its own, unless the need to do so was
great. The costs inside the state—from higher auto prices to, possibly,
the unavailability of the product—would ensure that this would occur
only in unusual circumstances. California clearly receives co-benefits in
other pollution reduction (that is severe in California), which makes this
step a logical one for that state because the benefits outweigh the costs
of adopting a unique product standard to control pollution.
What about cap-and-trade? Cap-and-trade programs seem mostly
analogous to criteria pollutant controls through state implementation
plans—an area in which the states have not taken aggressive action.
Rather, the federal government has had to force states to meet minimum
standards. Before the modern Clean Air Act in 1970, only California
had serious state environmental controls, and it has not exceeded the
federal criteria standards since that time; indeed, California has had
trouble meeting them.63
One could expect the same consequence of cap-and-trade schemes. If
a federal system is in place and working, a state would have negative
63. Only Los Angeles was classified as an extreme non-attainment area in the 1990
amendments to the CAA. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (2009).
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incentives to run its own program. For a state to run its own program
would increase costs on sources that conduct in-state business with very
few commensurate benefits since the benefits would be global. Compare
this model with the controls on hazardous air pollutants, where states
have been active and benefits accrue locally.
Though many states have joined some regional greenhouse gas capand-trade control regimes, only California seems to have a serious
economy-wide cap that could be compared with a stringent federal
system. Again, this model is similar to the type that existed before the
modern Clean Air Act, and it is probable that, even without official
preemption, states would not undertake a cap-and-trade program unless
the federal program were ineffective.
The one plausible exception to this would occur if states became
wedded to money that could come their way if they sold emissions
allocations. In the current budget climate, these monies could provide
an easy way for states to generate funds without increasing taxes. This
situation could result in a collective action problem, but here, once more,
we do not have enough information. If such fees were recognized as a
tax, and if only in-state sources could be brought under an additional
state cap, then it is still likely that a state would not do so due to the instate costs of lost business and higher consumer prices.
VII. CONCLUSION
We cannot predict with certainty how states would act if the federal
government granted them the power to add additional climate-change
requirements on businesses in their states. However, from our history
with other environmental laws, it appears that very little danger of a state
exceeding a federal pollution control exists, unless the state believed that
such an additional requirement were necessary to protect the health of its
own citizens. Very few opportunities in environmental law permit collective
action problems—where a state acts to benefit its citizens while imposing
costs outside of the state. This may be true even with products, which
we have generally assumed should fall under one national standard.
Major climate-change policies seem no different from prior environmental
laws, indicating that states would act similarly with respect to additional
climate-change controls.
Generally, given that federal law should only preempt state law when
it serves a particularly important purpose, preemption in the climatechange arena is uncalled for. However, some exceptions to this principle do
exist, including considerations of unilateral state health criteria and,
possibly, receiving monies from cap-and-trade auctions, but these
exceptions are small. Overall, environmental law history suggests and
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supports avoiding preemption in the climate law realm. States will rarely
use their power to create unique regulatory schemes, and when they do,
they only do so when it is necessary to protect the health and well-being
of their citizens—a state’s most important role.
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